IS THE FTCA STRICTLY OR LIBERALLY CONSTRUED?

The FTCA should not be strictly construed. The FTCA is a “broad waiver of sovereign immunity.” Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988); Clement v. United States, 980 F.2d 48, 53 n.12 (1st Cir. 1992) (same); Kelley v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 359 (1st Cir. 1991). The “broad and just purpose” of the FTCA is “to compensate the victims of negligence in the conduct of governmental activities in circumstances like unto those in which a private person would be liable.” Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68–69 (1955).

The traditional waiver of sovereign immunity rules do not apply to the FTCA. The FTCA is not strictly construed “in terms of its scope, in favoring of the sovereign.” Dolan v. United States, 546 U.S. 481, 491–92 (2006). That’s because, “in the FTCA context, where unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of defeating the central purpose of the statute, which waives the Government's immunity from suit in sweeping language.” Id. (internal citations & quotations omitted).

The general rule when it comes to the FTCA starts with the “sweeping waiver of sovereign immunity.” Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S. 932, 932 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting to denial of cert.); see also Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 499 (11th Cir. 1997) (“broad wavier”); Phillips v. United States, 956 F.2d 1071, 1074 (11th Cir. 1992) (The FTCA is a “broad waiver of sovereign immunity” for the wrongful acts or omissions of the United States); Clement v. United States, 980 F.2d 48, 53 n.12 (1st Cir. 1992) (“The Federal Tort Claims Act operates as a broad waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity”); Irving v. United States, 909 F.2d 598, 600 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The FTCA is a broad waiver of sovereign immunity”). Or, as the Seventh Circuit put it: “[a]s we construe this language, we must bear in mind the Supreme Court’s insistence that we not construe the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA too strictly.” Bunch v United States, 880 F.3d 938, 944–45 (7th Cir. 2018).

In summary, when interpreting the FTCA, courts should not strictly construe it to prevent claimants from recovery under traditional common law tort principles.